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Summary. In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given
bimatrix game all stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
Further the procedure is refined to find the strictly perfect equilibria (if any) of
such a game.
Keywords and Phrases: Bimatrix game, Computation, Stable equilibrium,
Strictly perfect equilibrium.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
1 Introduction
History. An n-person (noncooperative) game is a game in which each player has
to choose one of his (finite number of) pure strategies without any prior knowl-
edge of what the other players are going to do. Given the choices of all players
each player receives a payoff. The players are also allowed to mix over pure
strategies, i.e. to use probability distributions over pure strategies to determine
their respective choices. Payoffs are then determined as expected payoffs with
respect to the mixtures employed by the players. Nash (1950) showed that such
games always have at least one equilibrium.
Since then it has become clear that this notion of Nash equilibrium is not the
final answer to the problem of solving games. It is for instance well known that
a Nash equilibrium may use weakly dominated strategies (a strategy is called
weakly dominated if there is another strategy that does at least as good as this
strategy against any combination of strategies of the opponents and strictly better
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against at least one). This observation, along with some other points of critique 1,
triggered a whole series of papers presenting different types of selection criteria
for Nash equilibria. Generally speaking the idea was to find a solution concept2
that weeded out the ”bad” Nash equilibria.
(Although there is also a line of literature that tries to weaken the equilibrium
conditions these notions usually address the coordination problem involved in
equilibrium selection. The Nash conditions themselves are hardly ever ques-
tioned.)
Basically we can distinguish two lines of research within equilibrium selection
theory. The first form of selection is known as refinement theory. Examples are
perfect equilibrium by Selten (1975), proper equilibrium by Myerson (1978) and
strictly perfect equilibrium by Okada (1981). These refinements were all designed
in order to mend a newly discovered flaw of either the original notion of Nash
equilibrium or of one of its previously defined refinements. The second stream
of literature is commonly known as the theory of stable sets. Its most renowned
exponents are defined in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), Mertens (1989, 1991) and
Hillas (1990). This line of research started with the seminal paper of Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986). They argued that the theory of refinements lacked a fundamental
basis. As we already said, most refinements were meant as patching-up jobs for
known solution concepts. Kohlberg and Mertens took a different approach. They
started with a list of desiderata that were in their view essential for any decent
solution concept. Only then they started to search for solution concepts that
actually satisfied the desiderata. This quest more or less ended with the papers
of Mertens (1989, 1991) in which he presented a definition of stable sets that he
argued to be essentially the right concept.
Computation. For several reasons it is desirable to have an algorithm that com-
putes a given notion of equilibrium selection. First of all an algorithm shows that
the notion is more than a theoretical tool. An algorithm unambiguously shows
that it is always possible (at least within the domain considered) to actually
compute the equilibrium for the given game. Besides that an algorithm can be
implemented on a computer, which gives us the opportunity to analyze fairly
large and complicated examples.
There is extensive literature on the computation of Nash equilibrium and its
selections. Algorithms for the computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games
can for example be found in Lemke and Howson (1964), Winkels (1979) and
Krohn et al. (1991). These algorithms are implementable and exact3. A general
n-person version of the Lemke-Howson approach is described in Rosenmu¨ller
(1971). This procedure is not directly implementable though. Implementable al-
gorithms (based on path-following algorithms for roots of homotopies) for the
1 For an elaborate discussion of the issues involved here we refer to Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
2 A solution concept is a rule that assigns to each game a collection of (sets of) strategy combi-
nations of that game.
3 An algorithm is called exact in this case if, given the data of the game, it takes a finite number
of operations to exactly produce a strategy for each player that together define a (selection of) Nash
equilibrium.
On the computation of stable sets and strictly perfect equilibria 327
computation of a Nash equilibrium for n-person games are developed in van den
Elzen and Herings (1999) and Herings and Peters (1999).
Concerning the computation of equilibrium selection, Yamamoto (1993) de-
scribes a path-following procedure for the computation of a proper equilibrium.
This procedure is not fit for implementation though. Talman and Yang (1994)
describe an algorithm for the computation of a proper equilibrium that is imple-
mentable. Van den Elzen and Talman (1991) provide an implementable algorithm
for computation of a perfect equilibrium. Wilson (1992) devised an algorithm for
computation of what he calls a simply stable set. Finally Mertens (1989) provides
an idea of how to construct an algorithm for computation of his type of stable
sets.
Why bimatrices. Many solution concepts for n-person games can be defined as
the solution set of a number of polynomial (in)equalities (see for instance Blume
and Zame, 1994). One way to exploit this fact is explained by Mertens (1989).
He describes an algorithm that, given an n-person game, defines a finite number
of systems of polynomial inequalities whose solution sets (i.e. the union over all
systems of the solution sets of those systems) is a stable set in the sense of the
definition given in Mertens (1989). Such an approach can also be devised for the
computation of, for example, Nash equilibria, i.e. it is possible to find in finite
time a (finite) set of polynomial inequalities whose solutions are Nash equilibria.
However, in this paper we will show that it is possible to find a description of
the solution concepts in question in terms of the combinatorial structure underly-
ing these solutions. In fact we will exploit the construction used by Jansen et al.
(1994) in their proof of the finiteness of KM-stable sets. The example in Hillas
et al. (1997) clearly shows that this construction does not extend to games with
more than two players. Even though it is possible to construct a finite algorithm
in the above sense to compute stable sets, only for bimatrix games is it possible
to actually solve these inequalities.
Aim of the paper. In this paper we will focus on strictly perfect equilibria, defined
by Okada (1981) and what we will call KM-stable sets, defined by Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986). Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) considered the type of perturba-
tions introduced by Selten (1975) where every player has to play each of his
pure strategies with at least a specific minimal weight. Such a perturbation of
the game can itself also be viewed as a game in which the players have less
options than in the original game (in fact the perturbation can be interpreted as a
restriction on the strategy space). Moreover, it can be shown that these perturbed
games also have equilibria. Now Kohlberg and Mertens define a KM-set of the
game as a closed set of Nash equilibria for which each sufficiently small pertur-
bation of the game has an equilibrium close to the set itself. A KM-set is called
KM-stable if it does not contain another KM-set (i.e., it is minimal w.r.t. the
stability condition). Okada’s notion of strictly perfect equilibrium now coincides
with one-point KM-sets (and hence KM-stable sets. KM-sets that consist of one
point are automatically stable).
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It is our aim to describe a procedure that computes a KM-stable set for a
given bimatrix game. Further, we will explain how the central algorithm can
also be used to compute all KM-stable sets of that game. Because of the relation
between the notion of strictly perfect equilibrium and KM-stable set, this enables
us to compute a strictly perfect equilibrium (or all of them).
The algorithm. Presenting our exact algorithm we basically follow the paper of
Jansen et. al (1994). They showed that with each strategy pair (p, q) we can
associate a quadruple of subsets of the collections of pure strategies, namely the
carriers of p and q and the sets of pure best replies against p and q , respectively.
Given this quadruple it is possible to calculate precisely against which pertur-
bations of the game the strategy pair (p, q) offers protection4. In fact, any other
strategy pair that yields the same quadruple will offer the same protection.
This observation lies in the heart of the algorithm. Given a finite set of such
quadruples we can calculate the associated sets of perturbations against which
(any set of strategy pairs generating) these quadruples5 offers protection. This
paper shows that one can check in finite time whether or not this collection of
associated sets of perturbations covers the whole perturbation space.
We exploit this result in several ways. First of all, it enables us to calcu-
late precisely which collections of quadruples generate a minimal cover of the
perturbation space (minimal meaning that no proper subcollection of quadruples
generates a cover of the perturbation space). Further, given a set of which we
already know that it is a KM-set (such as the collection of all extreme Nash
equilibria by Jansen et al. (1994)) the above construction provides a method to
select a KM-stable set within the KM-set given. Finally, since a strictly perfect
equilibrium is simply a one-point KM-stable set, the computation of all KM-
stable sets also provides a way to calculate all strictly perfect equilibria. There
is also a procedure to compute just one strictly perfect equilibrium (if any) that
operates a bit more subtle. Since any bimatrix game that has a strictly perfect
equilibrium also has an extreme Nash equilibrium that is strictly perfect, it is
possible to check in finite time whether there is such an equilibrium as soon as
we can find all extreme Nash equilibria. This however has already been done in
e.g. Winkels (1979).
Notation. If M is a finite set, |M | denotes the number of elements of M and
∆M := {p ∈ IRM | pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ M and
∑
i∈M pi = 1}. For an i ∈ M ,
ei is the i -th unit vector in IRM . For a set S in IRn , ext(S ) denotes the set of
extreme points of S . For a vector x in IRn and ζ > 0, ‖x‖ denotes the maximum
norm and Bζ(x ) := {y ∈ IRn | ‖x − y‖ < ζ}. For a set S in IRn and ζ > 0,
Bζ(S ) :=
⋃
x∈S Bζ(x ). The Hausdorff distance dH (S ,T ) between two sets S and
T in IRn is the infimum over all ζ > 0 such that S ⊂ Bζ(T ) and T ⊂ Bζ(S ).
4 This is very typical for bimatrix games. It is possible to associate with the given strategy pair
a maximal set of perturbations such that any sufficiently small perturbation within this set has an
equilibrium close to (p, q). In fact this is the second reason to restrict ourselves to bimatrix games.
5 Of course the quadruples themselves do not offer protection against perturbations. However, since
strategy pairs that generate the same quadruples offer protection against the same perturbations, it is
possible, even convenient, to think in these terms.
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A collection C of sets is said to cover a set D if D is a subset of the union⋃
C∈C C over all sets C in C .
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we only consider bimatrix games. So we assume that there are two
players, player 1 and player 2. Player 1 has a finite set M and player 2 has
a finite set N of pure strategies. The payoff matrices (aij )i∈M ,j∈N of player 1
and (bij )i∈M ,j∈N of player 2 are denoted by A and B respectively. If the players
choose mixed strategies p ∈ ∆M and q ∈ ∆N , the payoff for player 1 is pAq and
the payoff for player 2 is pBq . An equilibrium of this game, which we denote
by (A,B ), is a strategy pair (p, q) such that
pAq ≥ p′Aq for all p′ ∈ ∆M
and pBq ≥ pBq ′ for all q ′ ∈ ∆N .
For a strategy p of player 1, the set C (p) = {i ∈ M | pi > 0} is called the
carrier of p while
PB2(p) := {j ∈ N | pBej ≥ pBek for all k ∈ N }
is the set of pure best replies of player 2 to p. For a strategy q of player 2,
the sets C (q) and PB1(q) are defined in a similar way. It is well-known that
(p, q) is an equilibrium of the game (A,B ) if and only if C (p) ⊂ PB1(q) and
C (q) ⊂ PB2(p).
In this paper pairs (I , J ), where I ⊂ M and J ⊂ N play a prominent role.
Definition A pair (I , J ) corresponds to a strategy pair (p, q) if
C (p) ⊂ I ⊂ PB1(q) and C (q) ⊂ J ⊂ PB2(p).
We also say that the pair (p, q) corresponds to the pair (I , J ).
2.1 Perturbed games
A perturbation for player 1 is a vector δ = (δi )i∈M with δi ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈M δi ≤ 1.
The collection of such perturbations is denoted by D . Similarly we can define
the collection E of perturbations ε = (εj )j∈N for player 2. A pair (δ, ε) of
perturbations is also called a perturbation.
A perturbation (δ, ε) induces a perturbed game (A,B , δ, ε). In this game player
1 is only allowed to play a strategy pair in the restricted strategy space ∆M (δ) :=
{p ∈ ∆M | pi ≥ δi for all i ∈ M }, while player 2’s choices are restricted to the
set ∆N (ε) that is defined in a similar way. The payoff functions and equilibria of
this perturbed game are defined in the obvious way. The collection of equilibria
of the perturbed game (A,B , δ, ε) is denoted by E (A,B , δ, ε).
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In order to characterize the equilibria of the perturbed game (A,B , δ, ε) we
introduce for player 1 the so-called δ-carrier Cδ(p) := {i ∈ M | pi > δi}.
Analogously one can define the ε-carrier of a strategy q of player 2. The following
characterization, which plays an important role in this paper, can already be found
in Lemma 2.3 in Vermeulen (1996).
Lemma 1 The strategy pair (p, q) is an equilibrium of the perturbed game
(A,B , δ, ε) if and only if the δ-carrier of p is a subset of PB1(q) and the ε-carrier
of q is a subset of PB2(p).
2.2 Stable sets
Notice that the choice δ = 0 (the null element of the vector space IRM ) and ε = 0
returns the original bimatrix game (A,B ).
Definition A closed set S in ∆M ×∆N of strategy pairs is called a KM-set if for
each neighborhood V of S there exists a number η > 0 such that V ∩E (A,B , δ, ε)
is not empty whenever ‖(δ, ε)‖ < η. A minimal KM-set – minimal with respect
to set inclusion – is called KM-stable.
Jansen et. al. (1994) showed that
Proposition 1 Every KM-set of a bimatrix game contains a finite KM-set.
2.3 A result on sensitivity analysis
An important ingredient of this paper is a result of Cook, Gerards, Schrijver and
Tardos on the sensitivity of the solution set of a system of linear inequalities to
right-hand perturbations of the system. We will use the following simple version
of this result.
LetAx ≥B d be a system of linear inequalities and let ϕ(d ) := {x |Ax ≥
B d} be the solution set of this system given d .
Proposition 2 There exists a constant K > 0 such that
dH (ϕ(d ), ϕ(e)) ≤ K‖d − e‖
for all vectors d and e such that ϕ(d ) and ϕ(e) are not empty.
3 Geometry of the equilibrium correspondence
Lemma 1 shows that sets of pure strategies are important in the analysis of
equilibria. That this is not just idle talk is exemplified in the following.
Let I ⊂ M be a set of pure strategies of player 1 and let J ⊂ N be a set
of pure strategies of player 2. With these two sets of pure strategies we can
associate a subset SIJ of the product ∆M ×D of the strategy space ∆M and the
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collection D of perturbations. This set SIJ is formally defined as the collection
of solutions (p, δ) in IRM × IRM of the system of linear (in)equalities

pBej − pBek ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J and all k ∈ N
pi ≥ δi for all i ∈ I
pi = δi for all i /∈ I
0 ≤ δi for all i ∈ M∑
i∈M
pi = 1.
(∗)
The first group of inequalities states that every pure strategy in J is a best reply
against p. The second and third group of (in)equalities guarantee that p is an
element of ∆(δ) and that moreover the δ-carrier of p is a subset of I . The fourth
and fifth group of (in)equalities are merely added to guarantee that p is indeed a
strategy and δ is indeed a perturbation as soon as (p, δ) is a solution of the above
system of inequalities. (The ”missing” inequalities pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈M δi ≤ 1 are
already implied by the above system.)
Further, note that the variable p only occurs on the left-hand side of the
(in)equality signs while the variable δ only occurs on the right-hand side. There-
fore we can define two matrices AIJ and BIJ , whose entries are completely
determined by I and J such that the above system of linear inequalities reads as
AIJ p ≥BIJ δ.
The conversion of the smaller-than sign and the equalities in the system (∗) into
the larger-than signs in the latter system of inequalities can of course easily be
established.
In ∆N × E we can analogously define the set TIJ by a system of linear
inequalities and represent this system by
CIJ q ≥ DIJ ε.
The main advantage of this rather abstract setup is that it enables us to use
Proposition 2. Why that is an interesting thing to do becomes clear once we
have the following
Lemma 2 Let (p, q) be a strategy pair. Then (p, q) is an equilibrium of the
perturbed game (A,B , δ, ε) if and only if, for some pair (I , J ), (p, δ) is an element
of SIJ and (q , ε) is an element of TIJ .
Proof. For a pair (I , J )

(p, δ) ∈ SIJ
(q , ε) ∈ TIJ
⇐⇒


AIJ p ≥BIJ δ
CIJ q ≥ DIJ ε
⇐⇒


Cδ(p) ⊂ I ⊂ PB1(q)
Cε(q) ⊂ J ⊂ PB2(p).
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P
IJ

(0; 0; p; q)
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perturbation space
D  E

M

N
Figure 1
Hence if (p, δ) ∈ SIJ and (q , ε) ∈ TIJ , then Lemma 1 implies that (p, q) is an
equilibrium of the perturbed game (A,B , δ, ε). If (p, q) ∈ E (A,B , δ, ε), then take
I = Cδ(p) and J = Cε(q). 
The foregoing lemma tells us in fact that we can view the polyhedral set
SIJ ×TIJ as part of the graph of the equilibrium correspondence over D ×E . In
order to formalize this idea we define the correspondence ϕIJ : IRM+ ×IRN+ →∆M ×
∆N as follows: for all (δ, ε) ∈ IRM × IRN ,
ϕIJ (δ, ε) := {(p, q) ∈ ∆M ×∆N | (p, δ) ∈ SIJ and (q , ε) ∈ TIJ } ⊂ E (A,B , δ, ε).
The set of points (δ, ε) for which ϕIJ (δ, ε) is not empty is denoted by PIJ . Note
that every element (δ, ε) of PIJ is automatically a perturbation. Furthermore, we
can also write PIJ as P ′IJ × P ′′IJ with
P ′IJ := {δ | (p, δ) ∈ SIJ for some p}.
Finally, if (p, q) is an equilibrium of the game (A,B ) and the pair (I , J ) corre-
sponds to (p, q), then (p, q) ∈ ϕIJ (0, 0). So (0, 0) ∈ PIJ . Also, for all sufficiently
small (δ, ε) ∈ PIJ , the game (A,B , δ, ε) has an equilibrium close to (p, q).
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Example. The above figure is to clarify the geometrical intuition underlying the
construction just described. The horizontal plane containing the two horizontal
axes depicts the perturbation space D ×E while the vertical axis stands for the
strategy space ∆M ×∆N . The block containing the point (0, 0, p, q) represents the
polyhedral set SIJ ×TIJ . In the figure the pair (I , J ) is supposed to correspond to
(p, q). By definition of ϕIJ this block is equal to the graph of the correspondence
ϕIJ .
In Figure 1 the set SIJ × TIJ has six extreme points. The domain PIJ on
which the correspondence ϕIJ is not empty is precisely the convex hull of the
projections of the extreme points of SIJ ×TIJ onto the perturbation space D ×E .
This specific fact will be used in the next section.
4 Characterization of finite KM-sets
We exploit the results from the previous section as follows. For a finite set F of
equilibria
P (F ) := {PIJ | (I , J ) corresponds to some element of F}.
Then we have the following
Theorem 1 F is a KM-set if and only if the collection P (F ) covers a neighbor-
hood of the zero perturbation (0, 0) in IRM+ × IRN+ .
Proof. (A) Suppose that P (F ) covers a neighborhood of the zero perturbation
(0, 0). We have to show that F is a KM-set. To this end, take a real number
ζ > 0. It is sufficient to show that there exists a number η > 0 such that
Bζ(F ) ∩ E (A,B , δ, ε)
is not empty whenever ‖(δ, ε)‖ < η.
We will construct an appropriate η in two steps. Firstly we take a real number
η∗ > 0 such that every perturbation (δ, ε) with
‖(δ, ε)‖ < η∗
is an element of some set PIJ in P (F ).
Secondly, consider a fixed set PIJ in P (F ) and let (δ, ε) be a perturbation
contained in PIJ . Since
(p, q) ∈ ϕIJ (δ, ε) ⇐⇒ (p, δ) ∈ SIJ and (q , ε) ∈ TIJ
⇐⇒
[
AIJ 0
0 CIJ
][
p
q
]
≥
[
BIJ 0
0 DIJ
][
δ
ε
]
,
PIJ is precisely the collection of vectors (δ, ε) in IRM for which the above system
is solvable. So, by Proposition 2 there exists a constant KIJ > 0 such that for
any two perturbations (δ, ε) and (δ′, ε′) in PIJ
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dH
(
ϕIJ (δ, ε), ϕIJ (δ′, ε′)
) ≤ KIJ ‖(δ, ε)− (δ′, ε′)‖.
Now choose a real number η > 0 such that η ≤ η∗ and moreover
η ≤ min { ζ
KIJ
| PIJ ∈ P (F )}.
Next, take an arbitrary perturbation (δ, ε) with ‖(δ, ε)‖ < η. We will show that
Bζ(F ) ∩ E (A,B , δ, ε)
is not empty, which will conclude the first part of the proof.
Since η ≤ η∗, we know that (δ, ε) is an element of some PIJ in P (F ).
Let (p˜, q˜) be a point in F that corresponds to the pair (I , J ). We will show in
particular that
Bζ(p˜, q˜) ∩ E (A,B , δ, ε)
is not empty. To this end, note that (p˜, q˜) is an element of ϕIJ (0, 0). Furthermore,
dH (ϕIJ (δ, ε), ϕIJ (0, 0)) ≤ KIJ ‖(δ, ε)‖ < KIJ · η ≤ KIJ · ζKIJ = ζ.
These two facts combined imply that there is a strategy pair (p, q) in ϕIJ (δ, ε) ⊂
E (A,B , δ, ε) whose distance to (p˜, q˜) is smaller than ζ.
(B) Conversely, suppose that F is a KM-set. We have to show that P (F ) covers
a neighborhood of the zero perturbation. So we need to specify a real positive
number such that every perturbation whose norm is smaller that this number is
an element of some PIJ in P (F ). Choosing this particular number requires some
effort.
First, take an element (p˜, q˜) of F . By Lemmas 8.5 and 8.6 of Vermeulen
(1996) there exist real numbers η > 0 and ζ > 0 such that for any (δ, ε) with
‖(δ, ε)‖ < η and (p, q) ∈ ∆M (δ) × ∆N (ε) with ‖(p, q) − (p˜, q˜)‖ < ζ we have
that
C (p˜) ⊂ Cδ(p) and PB1(q) ⊂ PB1(q˜)
and C (q˜) ⊂ Cε(q) and PB2(p) ⊂ PB2(p˜).
Now, since F is finite, we may suppose that η and ζ do not depend on (p˜, q˜) ∈ F .
Furthermore, given the number ζ > 0 we can use the assumption that F is a
KM-set to obtain a real number κ > 0 such that for any perturbation (δ, ε) with
‖(δ, ε)‖ < κ we have that
Bζ(F ) ∩ E (A,B , δ, ε)
is not empty.
Switching back to the main problem, take a perturbation (δ, ε) with ‖(δ, ε)‖ <
min{η, κ}. We will show that (δ, ε) is an element of some set PIJ in P (F ). To
this end, note that Bζ(F ) ∩ E (A,B , δ, ε) is not empty since ‖(δ, ε)‖ < κ. So,
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we can find a point (p˜, q˜) in F and an equilibrium (p, q) of the perturbed game
(A,B , δ, ε) such that
‖(p˜, q˜)− (p, q)‖ < ζ.
Now take I := Cδ(p) and J := Cε(q). We will show (1), that (δ, ε) is an element
of PIJ and (2), that PIJ is an element of P (F ).
(1) Since (p, q) is an equilibrium of (A,B , δ, ε) we know by Lemma 1 that
Cδ(p) ⊂ PB1(q) and Cε(q) ⊂ PB2(p).
So, in particular,
J = Cε(q) ⊂ PB2(p)
which, together with the fact that I = Cδ(p) shows that (p, δ) is indeed an element
of SIJ . Similarly we get that (q , ε) is an element of TIJ . So, (p, q) is an element
of ϕIJ (δ, ε), which immediately implies that (δ, ε) is an element of PIJ .
(2) In order to check that PIJ is an element of P (F ) we need to prove
that (I , J ) corresponds to some element of F . Since ‖(δ, ε)‖ < η and ‖(p˜, q˜) −
(p, q)‖ < ζ, we know that
C (p˜) ⊂ Cδ(p) and PB1(q) ⊂ PB1(q˜) and C (q˜) ⊂ Cε(q) and PB2(p) ⊂ PB2(p˜).
by the particular choices of η and ζ. So, using the fact that (p, q) is an equilibrium
of (A,B , δ, ε),
C (p˜) ⊂ Cδ(p) = I ⊂ PB1(q) ⊂ PB1(q˜).
A similar line of reasoning yields
C (q˜) ⊂ J ⊂ PB1(q˜)
and we have that (I , J ) indeed corresponds to some element of F . 
5 The algorithm
In this section we will discuss how the results from the previous section can be
used to check in finite time whether a given finite set F of strategy pairs is a
KM-set. We will also elaborate on how this can be used to compute a KM-stable
set or even all KM-stable sets.
So, let F be a finite set of strategy pairs of the game (A,B ). Now if we want
to apply Theorem 1 to check whether F is a KM-set we need to resolve two
problems. Firstly, the theorem does not specify a neighborhood. Secondly, given
a neighborhood, we would need to check whether P (F ) covers it. The next line
of reasoning offers a way out of these problems.
With a set PIJ in P (F ) we associate the set QIJ in ∆M ×∆N defined by
QIJ = {(p, q) ∈ ∆M ×∆N | (λp, µq) ∈ PIJ for some numbers λ > 0 and µ > 0}.
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This set is obtained by normalizing the nonzero perturbations in P ′IJ and P ′′IJ .
Now let Q (F ) be the collection of all sets QIJ we can thus construct. Then we
get
Theorem 2 Q (F ) covers ∆M ×∆N if and only if P (F ) covers a neighborhood
of (0, 0).
Proof. It is easy to check that Q (F ) covers the strategy space ∆M ×∆N whenever
P (F ) covers a neighborhood of (0, 0).
To prove the converse statement, suppose that Q (F ) covers ∆M ×∆N . Take
an element PIJ = P ′IJ × P ′′IJ in P (F ). Then we know that (0, 0) is an element
of PIJ . So, 0 is an element of P ′IJ and the other 0 is an element of P ′′IJ . Hence,
according to Lemma 4 (which can be found in the Appendix together with the
Lemmas 3, 5 and 6), we can associate a number ηIJ > 0 with P ′IJ and a number
ζIJ > 0 with P ′′IJ . Furthermore, since P (F ) is finite, we can take a real number
η > 0 smaller than any of the numbers ηIJ and ζIJ thus found. We will show
that the neighborhood Bη(0, 0) is covered by P (F ).
To this end, take a perturbation (δ, ε) with ‖(δ, ε)‖ < η. Assume for the
moment that (δ, ε) is completely mixed (i.e. δi > 0 for all i and εj > 0 for all j ).
Then, since both δ and ε are not equal to zero, we can find numbers λ > 0 and
µ > 0 such that (λδ, µε) is an element of ∆M ×∆N . So, since Q (F ) is assumed
to cover ∆M ×∆N there must be an element QIJ that contains (λδ, µε). However,
this means that there are numbers λ′ > 0 and µ′ > 0 such that (λ′λδ, µ′µε) is
an element of PIJ . Hence, since ‖δ‖ < η < ηIJ and ‖ε‖ < η < ζIJ , Lemma 4
states that (δ, ε) is an element of P ′IJ × P ′′IJ = PIJ .
So now we know that P (F ) covers the collection of completely mixed
perturbations (δ, ε) with ‖(δ, ε)‖ < η. So, since P (F ) is finite and each element
of P (F ) is compact by Lemma 3, P (F ) also covers the closure of the collection
of completely mixed perturbations (δ, ε) with ‖(δ, ε)‖ < η. This latter set though
contains Bη(0, 0). 
This theorem reduces our problem (to check in finite time whether a given
finite set F of strategy pairs of the game (A,B ) is a KM-set) to:
(1) can we compute the collection Q (F ) in finite time and
(2) can we check in finite time whether Q (F ) covers ∆M ×∆N .
We will address these questions separately in the next two subsections.
5.1 Computation of Q (F )
Given the set F we can calculate for every (p, q) ∈ F the sets C (p), PB1(q),
C (q) and PB2(p) in finite time. So, we can also determine in finite time all pairs
(I , J ) that correspond to some (p, q) ∈ F . Therefore we can write down all
systems of linear inequalities of the form
AIJ p ≥ BIJ δ
and CIJ q ≥ DIJ ε
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in finite time. This means that we can calculate in finite time a polyhedral de-
scription of the set SIJ × TIJ for each pair (I , J ).
Now a set PIJ in P (F ) is simply the orthogonal projection of the correspond-
ing set SIJ × TIJ onto the perturbation space D × E . (Formally this projection
maps onto IRM+ × IRN+ but it is easily verified that the set PIJ is even a subset of
D × E .) So, in order to calculate PIJ we first need to determine the set
ext (SIJ × TIJ ) = ext(SIJ )× ext(TIJ ).
Given the polyhedral descriptions of SIJ and TIJ this can also be done in finite
time. So, this enables us to calculate the set
GIJ := {(δ, ε) ∈ IRM+ × IRN+ | (p, δ, q , ε) ∈ ext(SIJ × TIJ ) for some pair (p, q)
∈ IRM × IRN }
= {δ | (p, δ) ∈ ext(SIJ ) for some p} × {ε | (q , ε) ∈ ext(TIJ ) for some q}
= G ′IJ × G ′′IJ .
However, it can easily be seen that this set GIJ includes ext(PIJ ). So, PIJ is the
convex hull of GIJ . Now we have in some sense calculated the set P (F ) in
finite time. Each element PIJ of P (F ) is stored as the convex hull of the set
GIJ . These sets GIJ can indeed be computed in finite time.
Now we turn to the computation of Q (F ). In order to get a representation
for each of the elements of Q (F ), take an element GIJ that represents a set PIJ
in P (F ). Define
H ′IJ = {δ/
∑
i∈M
δi | δ ∈ G ′IJ and δ = 0}.
Similarly we define H ′′IJ . The set HIJ := H ′IJ × H ′′IJ is obviously a subset of the
strategy space ∆M ×∆N . Moreover, by Lemma 6, QIJ is precisely the convex
hull of HIJ . Hence, it is verified that HIJ contains the set of extreme points of
QIJ .
5.2 The covering problem
Now we have a representation of each set QIJ in Q (F ) in the form of the set
HIJ . The set QIJ itself is simply the convex hull of HIJ . So now we can address
the second problem. How do we check whether Q (F ) covers ∆M ×∆N ? To do
this we need to calculate a system
HIJ
[
p
q
]
≥ bIJ
of linear inequalities whose solution set is exactly QIJ . Given the set HIJ that can
also be done in finite time. Given this polyhedral description of the polytopes
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in Q (F ) it is possible to show that the covering problem can be solved in finite
time. This is easier to explain in a somewhat more general setting.
Suppose that a polytope P in IRn is given by the system
P x ≥ b
of linear inequalities where P is an m × n matrix. Furthermore, suppose that
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J } a polytope Qj in IRn is given by the system
Qj x ≥ cj
of linear inequalities where Q is a kj ×n matrix. The central question is whether
the polytopes Q1, . . . ,QJ cover the polytope P . Note first that we may assume
w.l.o.g. that P is of full dimension. Otherwise we can restrict the problem to the
affine hull of P (in finite time!).
In order to explain how we can check whether Q1, . . . ,QJ cover P we intro-
duce the notion of transversal system.
Definition Given the systems of polyhedral inequalities that describe the poly-
topes Q1, . . . ,QJ and P , a tranversal system over the sets Q1, . . . ,QJ w.r.t. P is
a system of linear inequalities of the form

ek1Q1x < (c1)k1
.
.
.
ekJQJ x < (cJ )kJ
P x ≥ b.
So, from each system Qj x ≥ cj we pick precisely one row, say kj , and change
the greater-than-or-equal sign into a smaller-than sign. Furthermore we add the
inequalities that describe the polytope P .
Now it is obvious that Q1, . . . ,QJ cover P if and only if each transversal
system is not solvable. This is so if and only if the solution to the linear problem
to maximize y subject to 

ek1Q1x + y ≤ (c1)k1
.
.
.
ekJQJ x + y ≤ (cJ )kJ
P x ≥ b
is smaller or equal to zero. This latter statement can be verified in finite time
using a simple linear program solver.
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Hence, Q (F ) covers ∆M ×∆N if and only if each transversal system over
the set of all proper pairs (I , J ) of the systems
HIJ
[
p
q
]
≥ bIJ
w.r.t. ∆M × ∆N is empty. According to the above argumentation this can be
checked in finite time.
6 Computation of KM-stable sets and strictly perfect equilibria
Let (A,B ) be a bimatrix game and let F be a finite set of strategy pairs. From
Theorem 1 we know how to check whether F is KM-stable or not. F is KM-stable
if and only if
(1) P (F ) covers a neighborhood of (0, 0), and
(2) there exists no proper subset G of F such that P (G) covers a neigh-
borhood of (0, 0).
Given the set F we know how to check both items in finite time. This gives us
an opportunity to compute KM-stable sets. One way to do that works as follows.
Suppose we know that F is a KM-set. Then it is easy to construct a KM-
stable subset of F . Check for each proper subset G of the set F whether it is a
KM-set. If none of these sets is a KM-set, then F is KM-stable. If one of these
sets is a KM-set, repeat the above procedure with respect to this new set. Since
F is finite we will find a KM-stable subset of F in a finite number of steps.
So the only question is whether we can find a finite set F of which we know
that it is a KM-set. There is at least one way to find such a set.
Jansen et al. (1994) showed that the set of extreme equilibrium points is a
KM-set of the game (A,B ). This set can be computed in finite time.
6.1 Computation of all KM-stable sets
However, from the formulation of (1) and (2) we can also derive a more general
procedure for the computation of KM-sets.
LetA be a collection of pairs (I , J ) with I ⊂ M and J ⊂ N . With each pair
(I , J ) we can associate a set PIJ . Let P be the collection of sets of the form PIJ
with (I , J ) ∈A. Then we can check in finite time whether
(1) P covers a neighborhood of (0, 0), and
(2) P has no proper subcollection that covers a neighborhood of (0, 0).
Now suppose that we do have such a set A (i.e. its associated set P covers
(0, 0) and no proper subcollection of P does so). Then we can construct a set
F as follows.
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(1) Take a pair (I , J ) inA. Since no proper subset of P covers a neighbor-
hood of (0, 0) we know that (0, 0) is an element of PIJ . Therefore it is possible
to compute an equilibrium (pIJ , qIJ ) in ϕIJ (0, 0).
(2) Once this is done for every set PIJ in P we know that the finite set
F := {(pIJ , qIJ ) | (I , J ) ∈A}
is a KM-set. Hence, we can find a KM-stable subset of F using the procedure
described above.
The assertion now is that every KM-stable set can be found in this way given
that we pick the right equilibria in step (1) and throw out the right equilibria in
the selection procedure. In this sense it is possible to compute all KM-stable
sets of a given bimatrix game. Notice that generically speaking each set PIJ
admits only one choice. So, generically it is possible to actually write down all
KM-stable sets.
6.2 Computation of strictly perfect equilibria
In this section we will discuss how the results from the previous section can
be used to check in finite time whether or not a given strategy pair is a strictly
perfect equilibrium. It will also enable us to compute one (if existing) or even
all strictly perfect equilibria.
Definition A strategy pair (p, q) in ∆M × ∆N is called a strictly perfect equi-
librium if for each neighborhood V of (p, q) there exists a number η > 0 such
that
V ∩ E (A,B , δ, ε)
is not empty whenever ‖(δ, ε)‖ < η.
Obviously a strategy pair (p, q) is a strictly perfect equilibrium if and only
if {(p, q)} is a KM-set. So, if we want to find a strictly perfect equilibrium, we
can use the following procedure. First calculate all sets P that are minimally
covering. Secondly, check whether the sets ϕIJ (0, 0) associated with P have
a non-empty intersection. If yes, each element of this intersection is a strictly
perfect equilibrium. If no, then this set P only generates KM-stable sets (at least
one) that consists of more than one element.
A more efficient algorithm can be based on a result of Jansen et al. (1994).
In fact they prove that a bimatrix game possesses a strictly perfect equilibrium
if and only if there exists an extreme equilibrium that is strictly perfect. Now
there are algorithms that calculate all extreme equilibria of a bimatrix game.
Given these extreme equilibria, it can be checked whether any of them is strictly
perfect using the algorithm of the previous section. The result of Jansen et al.
now guarantees that either we find a strictly perfect equilibrium, or we find out
that the game in question does not have a strictly perfect equilibrium.
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7 Appendix A
In this section we will go into the details of the analysis of the systems of linear
inequalities that define the various sets used in the paper. First we will show
Lemma 3 The sets SIJ , TIJ , P ′IJ , P ′′IJ and PIJ are polytopes.
Proof. First consider the set SIJ . By definition this set is the collection of points
(p, δ) that satisfy the system AIJ p ≥ BIJ δ of linear inequalities. So SIJ is
polyhedral. Furthermore, the points in SIJ particularly satisfy

pi ≥ δi for all i ∈ I
pi = δi for all i /∈ I .
0 ≤ δi for all i ∈ M
1 ≥ ∑i∈M δi∑
i∈M pi = 1.
This clearly shows that SIJ is bounded. Hence, SIJ (and TIJ for similar reasons)
is a polytope.
Furthermore, P ′IJ is the set of δ such that (p, δ) ∈ SIJ for some p. Hence P ′IJ
is the image of the polytope SIJ under the linear map (p, δ) → δ. Hence, P ′IJ (and
P ′′IJ also) is a polytope. Finally, PIJ must be a polytope since it is the product of
the polytopes P ′IJ and P ′′IJ . 
Now we can prove the following lemma. Obviously we can do something
similar for P ′′IJ . Its associated positive real number is denoted by ζIJ .
Lemma 4 Suppose that 0 is an element of P ′IJ . Then there exists a real number
ηIJ > 0 such that any point δ with ‖δ‖ < ηIJ is an element of P ′IJ whenever λδ is
an element of P ′IJ for some real number λ > 0.
Proof. Since P ′IJ is a polytope by Lemma 3, we can find a system
F δ ≥ b
of linear inequalities whose solution set equals P ′IJ . Now since 0 is an element
of P ′IJ by assumption, we know that 0 = F 0 ≥ b. Let K be the collection of
numbers k for which 0 > bk , where bk is the k -th coordinate of b. Then for each
k ∈ K we can take a number ηk > 0 such that ekF δ > bk whenever ‖δ‖ < ηk .
Choose ηIJ > 0 smaller than any number ηk . Let δ be a point with ‖δ‖ < ηIJ
and suppose that λ > 0 is such that λδ is element of P ′IJ . Then, since ‖δ‖ < ηIJ
we know that
ekF δ > bk
for every k in K . So we only need to show that ehF δ ≥ bh for h /∈ K . Since
h is not an element of K , we know that 0 = bh . Further, since λδ is an element
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of P ′IJ we also know that F (λδ) ≥ b. So, in particular, ehF (λδ) ≥ bh = 0 and
(since λ > 0) we can calculate that
ehF δ = λ−1 ehF (λδ) ≥ λ−1 · 0 = 0 = bh .
This shows that F δ ≥ b and δ is an element of P ′IJ . 
Lemma 5 Let r and s be two points in IRM and suppose that p = ρr + (1 − ρ)s
for some 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Suppose further that a and b are two positive real numbers.
Then there is a positive multiple of p that is also a convex combination of ar and
bs.
Proof. We have to show that there are numbers 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 and ζ > 0 such that
ζp = κ(ar) + (1− κ)(bs).
Take κ := bρbρ + a(1− ρ) andζ :=
ab
bρ + a(1− ρ) .
It easily follows that 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 and ζ > 0 since a and b are positive and
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Moreover,
κ(ar) + (1− κ)(bs) = bρbρ + a(1− ρ) (ar) +
a(1− ρ)
bρ + a(1− ρ) (bs)
=
ab
bρ + a(1− ρ) (ρr + (1− ρ)s) = ζ (ρr + (1− ρ)s) = ζp.
Lemma 6 The set QIJ is the convex hull of the set HIJ .
Proof. We will exploit the decomposition of PIJ into the product P ′IJ ×P ′′IJ . Notice
that this enables us to write
QIJ = Q ′IJ × Q ′′IJ
where Q ′IJ := {p ∈ ∆M | λp ∈ P ′IJ for some number λ > 0}
and Q ′′IJ is defined analogously. It suffices to show that Q ′IJ is the convex hull of
H ′IJ . To this end, notice that P ′IJ is the collection of points δ in IRM for which
the system
Ap ≥B δ
has a solution p. So, any point δ in P ′IJ at least has to satisfy the inequalities
δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ M .
So, since G ′IJ := {δ | (p, δ) ∈ ext(SIJ ) for some p} is a subset of P ′IJ we
know that G ′IJ is a subset of the non-negative orthant of IRM . From this it easily
follows that H ′IJ is a subset of Q ′IJ since
∑
i∈M δi is automatically positive for
each non-zero element δ in the non-negative orthant.
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A. First we will show that Q ′IJ is convex. To this end, take two points r and s
in Q ′IJ . We will show that a convex combination ρr + (1− ρ)s is also an element
of Q ′IJ .
Since r and s are points in Q ′IJ we can take λ > 0 and µ > 0 such that λr
and µs are elements of P ′IJ . Furthermore, from Lemma 5 it follows that there
exists a positive multiple of ρr + (1 − ρ)s that is also a convex combination of
λr and µs . However, a convex combination of λr and µs must be an element of
P ′IJ since P ′IJ is convex. Hence, ρr + (1−ρ)s is a positive multiple of an element
in P ′IJ and therefore an element of Q ′IJ .
B. Conversely, let p be an element of Q ′IJ . We have to show that p is a
convex combination of elements in H ′IJ . To this end, notice that λp is an element
of P ′IJ and therefore a convex combination of the elements of G ′IJ . By changing
the multiple λ if necessary we can assume that it is even a convex combination
of the non-zero elements of G ′IJ .
Suppose that λp = ρr +(1−ρ)s , with r and s both in the non-negative orthant
and not equal to 0. Write
a :=
(∑
i∈M
ri
)−1
and b :=
(∑
i∈M
si
)−1
.
Then we can take κ and ζ as in Lemma 5 and we get that
ζλp = κ(ar) + (1− κ)(bs).
It is sufficient to show that ζλ = 1. To this end notice that
ζλ = ζλ
∑
i∈M
pi =
∑
i∈M
ζλpi =
∑
i∈M
[κ(ar) + (1− κ)(bs)]i
= κa
∑
i∈M
ri + (1− κ)b
∑
i∈M
si = 1.
Now the statement follows by induction to the number of non-zero elements
of G ′IJ that are used to write λp as a convex combination. 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